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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Introduction. 
This is the reply brief of Appellant, The Idaho Department of Transportation, (hereinafter 
referred to as "Department"). Craig William Hawkins (Hawkins) initially asked the Idaho 
Transportation Department for hearing on a proposed Administrative License Suspension for his 
failure of an evidentiary test for breath alcohol concentration. The Department's Hearing 
Examiner, John Tomlinson determined that the requirements for suspension of Hawkins' driving 
privileges set forth in Idaho Code § 18-8002A were complied with and Hawkins should have his 
driving privileges suspended for one year. 
Hawkins requested that the District Court review the decision of the Department's 
Administrative Hearing Examiner. Upon Judicial Review, the District Court set aside the decision 
of the Department's Hearing Examiner. 
The Department has appealed from the decision of the District Court. Hawkins has filed 
his responsive brief. 
b. Reference to the Department's Administrative Record. 
The Department's Administrative Record and the Transcript of the Department's 
Administrative Hearing are referred to in the Exhibits to Clerk's Record (Ex. CR.) and are 
identified by page number. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The issues characterized by the Department originally asked the Court to find that there 
was no per se constitutional violation as found by the District Court and any error was invited by 
Hawkins. Hawkins responds to the Department's characterization of the issues by indicating that 
Mr. Hawkins was harmed by not having sufficient opportunity to prepare for the hearing and that 
Hawkins did not invite error. 
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The Department's characterization of the issue that its prehearing Administrative License 
Suspension procedure did not violate Hawkins' constitutional right of due process continues to 
have two components: 
1. Any error occasioned by the Department's process was invited by Mr. Hawkins, and 
2. There is no per se constitutional violation. 
3. III. ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I 
Any error occasioned by the Department's process was invited by Mr. Hawkins. 
Hawkins requested that subpoenas be issued for the "production of all audio and video 
recordings which capture the stop, detention, arrest and the administration of the evidentiary test 
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or other intoxicating substances" 
(Ex. CR. 022). 
In response to Hawkins' request, the Department's Hearing Examiner enters an order April 
23, 2015 pursuant to IDAPA 39.02.72.300.01 indicating that a subpoena for relevant evidence 
would be issued (Ex. CR p. 031 ). 
The Hearing Examiner consistent with his order then issues a subpoena duces tecum dated 
April 23, 2015 to the evidence custodian, Lewiston Police Department compelling the production 
of "one copy of all audio and video of the stop/arrest/evidentiary testing of Craig William Hopkins 
on April 13, 2015, DR # 15 L5039". The subpoenaed material was to be received by May 5th 
2015. (Ex. CR p. 028). 1 
1 The subpoena issued to the evidence custodian, Lewiston Police Department advises Mr. Hawkins: ''This subpoena 
is issued upon the condition that the requesting party, attorney Jonathan Hally, phone number 413-6678 shall advance 
the reasonable cost of producing the books, papers, documents, or tangible things to the agency providing the 
evidence". 
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service 
The Department then forwarded the subpoena to Hawkins who made arrangements for the 
the subpoena. The subpoena duces tecum is then served on the Lewiston Police 
Department Evidence Custodian on April 23, 2015 (Ex. CR. 034). Hawkins then files with the 
Department, the Affidavit of Service of the subpoena duces tecum April 28, 2015 (Ex. CR. p. 035). 
Also on April 23, 2015 the Department issues a notice scheduling Mr. Hawkins' request 
for a hearing on the proposed administrative license suspension by telephone on May 4th 2015 (Ex. 
CR. p. 046). The Notice of Hearing advised Hawkins that: 
You have 7 daysfrom the date of this notice to request a 
continuance for good cause shown. Failure to request a 
continuance within 7 days may result in the denial o.lrequest. 
Hawkins arranged for the service of the Department's subpoena duces tecum which clearly 
requires the compliance of the Lewiston Police Department the day after the date of the hearing. 
Hawkins cannot now claim that he did not have sufficient opportunity to prepare for the 
hearing since he made aiTangements for the service of the subpoena and filed with the Department 
the Affidavit of Service of a subpoena clearly providing that the information Hawkins requested 
was to be provided the day after the scheduled hearing (Ex. CR. p. 035). 
Further Mr. Hawkins is notified in the April 23, 2015 Notice of Hearing that he could 
request that the hearing be continued for good cause shown. Based on what Mr. Hawkins argues 
now, not to the Department's Hearing Examiner, the opportunity to be properly prepared for the 
hearing by receiving all of the information Hawkins had requested, would appear to be good cause. 
Mr. Hawkins did not seek to have the hearing continued, did not attempt to show the 
Department prior to the date of the hearing that he would not have an opportunity to adequately 
prepare for the hearing if the subpoena duces tecum compelling the production of the requested 
information could be complied with the day after the hearing. 
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This is invited error. 
Hawkins acquiesced to and invited the error of the Department which he now claims denied 
him of due process. Clearly "error consented to, acquiesced in or invited are not reversible". State 
v. Owsley 105 Idaho 836, 838, 673 P. 2nd 436, 438 (1983). 2 
Mr. Hawkins failed to take advantage of the procedural protections made available by the 
Department. 
Hawkins now at the Administrative License Suspension hearing for the first time objects 
to not receiving the DVD recording of the circumstances of the stop of Mr. Hawkins.3 
Additionally Hawkins clearly suggests the resolution of the alleged due process claim to 
the Hearing Examiner. 
Hawkins accepts the Hearing Examiner's notation of the objection and the Hearing 
Examiner's intention to take that issue under advisement in his decision (See FN 3). 
"The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party who caused or played an important role in prompting 
a trial court to [take a certain action] from later challenging that [action] on appeal." Woodburn v. Manco Prods., 13 7 
Idaho 502 at 505, 50 P.3d 997 at 1000 (2002), Taylor v. McNichols, 149 !daho 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010). 
15 HEARING OFFER: Okay. And then as far as 
16 Petitioner's exhibits, I've got Exhibits A through F. I've got 
l 7 the first three~ A, B, and C ~ are affidavits of service; 
I 8 Exhibit D is the instrument operations log; Exhibit E, the 
I 9 performance verification; and, Exhibit F, the DVD. Now~ 
20 MR. HALLY: I do not have that. When was it sent 
21 to me? 
22 HEARING OFFICER: Yeah, the DVD was sent on the 
23 l si, Friday, so that's when that was received and mailed out to 
24 your office. 
25 Is there anything else that Mr. Hawkins is going 
I to be supplementing the record with? 
2 MR. HALLY: No, but I object to not receiving the 
3 subpoenaed material prior to the hearing. 
4 HEARING OFFICER: Okay. We'll make note of that, 
5 and I'll take that under advisement in - in my decision. 
6 MR. HALLY: Thank you. 
Ex. CR. I Tr. p. 3 LL. 15-25 & p. 4. LL. 1-6 
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Mr. Hawkins does not request a continuance of the hearing and instead accepts the Hearing 
Examiner's resolution of the objection at a later time. 
Hawkins then engages in a thorough and complete examination of Lewiston Police Officer 
Stormes.4 
There can be no reasonable argument the Hawkins was not thoroughly and carefully 
prepared for his examination of Officer Stormes. In fact Hawkins inquires of Officer Stormes 
matters which are not made part of the administrative record and of which apparently Hawkins 
was able to ask Officer Stormes without the discovery provided by the Department (See Ex. CR. 
l Tr. p. 9 LL.6-16. 
Then as Hawkins makes his closing argument to the Department's Hearing Examiner, 
Hawkins offers another solution to the fact that the recording of the stop of Mr. Hawkins' vehicle 
was not made available prior to the date of the hearing. Hawkins asks the Hearing Examiner to 
review the DVD and make his own conclusions as to what the DVD may mean. 5 
Important here is that the only question that Mr. Hawkins asks the Hearing Examiner to 
determine is "whether or not the officer was following behind him or did a U-turn to go after him" 
(See Ex. CR. 1 Tr. p. 30 LL. 15-16.). 
4 See Ex. CR. I Tr. p. 5 L. 19 - p. 25 L. 18. 
9 First of all, I don't have the audio - or, 
10 excuse me, the videorecording. I'm looking at the issuing 
1 1 subpoena. It does say to provide by May 51h, which is not 
12 tremendously helpful since the hearing is on May 4t1,_ I don't 
13 have a copy to - it wasn't provided to me as required, so it's 
14 not in evidence, I guess. I guess you can review it to see 
15 whether or not the officer was following behind him or did a 
16 U-turn to go after him. 
Ex. CR. 1 Tr. p. 30 LL. 9-16. (Emphasis added). 
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Whether Officer Stormes followed Hawkins' vehicle or did a U-turn to follow Hawkins 
vehicle is not one of the matters which Mr. Hawkins has the burden to demonstrate pursuant to 
LC. § 18-80002A(7)(a). 
This is exactly the kind of invited error that this Court has consistently determined is not 
the basis of a due process challenge. 6 
Clearly a driver who acquiesces in a process or who suggests a resolution to a process due 
issue as Hawkins does here cannot preserve a due process claim. 
This is neither key evidence or evidence which creates a risk of an erroneous deprivation 
of due process. Officer Stormes testifies consistently with his recollection of the circumstances of 
the stop. The factual question of whether Officer Stormes turned around or was following Hawkins 
does not affect Hawkins burden under LC. § 18-8002A(7)( a). 7 
Hawkins was more than adequately prepared for the examination of Officer Stormes and 
was not denied the evidence necessary for his preparation. Hawkins indicates what he believes the 
evidence would indicate and submits the matter for the Hearing Examiner's consideration having 
made the argument based upon the record Hawkins was more than prepared to create. 
6 
Thus, given that Beyer affirmatively accepted the hearing officer's remedy at the time of the hearing, 
even if the hearing officer erred by not requiring the video to be produced until the day of the 
hearing, Beyer cannot complaint of that error. 
In re Beyer, 155 ldaho 40, 304 P.3d 1206 (Ct. App. 2013). 
25 So you don't recall driving in opposite direction 
of Mr. Hawkins and then turning around to follow him? 
2 A. No, I don't. At this point, no. 
3 Q. So how long were you following behind him before 
4 you observed that he had a cracked windshield? 
Ex. CR. I Tr. p .7 L. 25 & p. 8 LL. 1-4. 
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The Department's procedure did not create an erroneous deprivation. Hawkins participates 
knowingly and willingly in the Department's Hearing Examiner's resolution of Hawkins' 
objection and in doing so invites the error that he now claims denied him the process due. 
Hawkins had procedural protections available which he did not exercise. Hawkins failure 
to exercise those options does not create an actionable erroneous deprivation resulting in a denial 
of due process. 
ISSUE II 
There is no per se constitutional violation. 
The Idaho Court thus far in considering due process challenges to the Department's process 
of issuing at a driver's request a subpoena duces tecum on nearly identical facts has never 
concluded there is a per se due process violation in the context of discovery in an Administrative 
License Suspension. 
The District Court's analysis fails to supply any basis for its conclusion that the procedures 
employed by ITD "substantially burdened Hawkins ability to make his case". (Opinion & Order 
CR p. 064) The District Court does not analyze how Hawkins was substantially burdened or any 
alternative procedure. The District Court fails to consider the substantial examination by Hawkins 
of Lewiston Police Department Officer Stormes. Nor does the District Court consider Hawkins' 
offer to resolve the fact that the DVD recording of the motor vehicle stop was not provided to 
Hawkins prior to the date of the hearing. 
Finally, the District Court does not analyze the record demonstrating the circumstances 
under which Hawkins requested a subpoena duces tecum. 
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Given these facts there is no probable value of any additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards other than those offered by the Department to Hawkins.8 
Hawkins was given notice of the administrative hearing (Ex. CR p. 046). Hawkins request 
for a subpoena duces tecum was granted by the Hearing Examiner and the compliance date was 
set out in subpoena duces tecum issued by the Hearing Examiner. 
The date of the administrative hearing was the day before the requested evidence was to be 
produced to the Department. Hawkins was notified that he had seven days after receipt of the 
notice of the administrative hearing to request a continuance by the showing of good cause (Ex. 
CR p. 046). Hawkins did not request that the hearing be continued based on the compliance date 
of the subpoena duces tecum, even though Hawkins was responsible for serving the subpoena 
duces tecum and supplying the affidavit of service to the Department. 
There is no probable value of any additional or substitute procedural safeguards here. The 
administrative process available to Hawkins offers sufficient procedural safeguards if only 
Hawkins would have taken advantage of those procedural safeguards. 
The issue of the Department permitting discovery and arguably creating an issue for the 
driver could be easily remedied by the Department's Hearing Examiner's simply denying Hawkins 
request for discovery for documents not in the Department's possession. 
The Attorney General's Rules of Administrative Procedure (IDAPA 04.11.01) provide that 
a party in an administrative process does not have the right to engage in discovery unless the 
discovery is authorized by statute, the parties move to compel discovery or the agency issues an 
8 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 l.Ed.2d 18 (1976) requires that the Court consider three factors, 
first the private interest that will be affected by the official action, second the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest of the procedures used and the probably value, if any of additional or substantive procedural safeguards and 
finally the Government's interest including the function involved and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement will entail. 
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order directing that the discovery be answered. (Rule 521 ). However subpoenas may be issued as 
authorized by statute upon a parties motion or upon the agency's own initiative (Rule 525). 
Idaho Code § l 8-8002A(7) only contemplates the testimony of the arresting officer if 
"directed to do so by a subpoena issued by the hearing officer". There is no statutory right to 
discovery other than to compel the appearance of the police officer. Document production by 
another governmental agency is not contemplated by I.C. § l 8-8002A(7). 
The Department's Hearing Examiner may upon written request issue subpoenas for the 
production of documentary or tangible evidence at a hearing. IDAPA 39.02.72.300.01. The driver 
in this setting is responsible for having the subpoena served and providing proof of service prior 
to the scheduled hearing. IDAPA 39.02.72.300.02 and 03. 
The Department attempted to provide documentation in the possession of the City of 
Lewiston (not ITD), however, the Department's failure to do so is not the grounds for staying or 
rescinding a suspension, IDAPA 39.02.72.400.01. 
Had the Department's Hearing Examiner simply denied Hawkins request for the issuance 
of a subpoena duces tecum, there would not be a due process violation. By the Department's 
ordering another governmental entity supply information pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum, the 
Department is extending a courtesy to Hawkins that it is under no statutory or regulatory 
obligation.9 
Notifying Hawkins of the date of the hearing and issuing a subpoena duces tecum which 
may compel discovery the day after the hearing is not a procedure implicating Hawkins due 
process. Instead the Department has provided discovery as a courtesy and notifies Hawkins of the 
9 In making this argument, the Department is cognizant of the Court's concerns about what happens when the subpoena 
issued by the Hearing Examiner compels compliance the day of or the day after the scheduled hearing, Bell v. Idaho 
Transp. Dept., 151 Idaho 659, 262 P.3d 1030 (Ct. App. 201 /). 
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circumstances under which the discovery is to occur. Hawkins is advised of his obligation to serve 
the subpoena duces tecum and provide the Department with an Affidavit of Service. 
Hawkins makes no showing that the timely production of the DVD recording would have 
reduced the risk that Hawkins was erroneously deprived of his driving privileges, Bell v. Idaho 
Transp. Dept., 151 Idaho 659,262 P.3d 1030.1040 (Ct. App. 2011). 
Hawkins does not demonstrate what harm or prejudice he may have suffered as a result of 
the Department's discovery procedure only that he could have been better prepared. Mr. Hawkins 
has to do more. 10 
The Department could simply decline to issue a subpoena duces tecum to another 
governmental entity at the request of the driver for which there would be no due process violation 
since the Department's rules do not contemplate production of records not in the Department's 
possession and formal discovery is not authorized by statute. 
No additional or substitute procedure would eliminate the harm alleged by Hawkins. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Department's practice of supplying subpoena duces tecum with compliance dates 
occurring after the date of the hearing continues to be problematic. The Department provides a 
solution to that problem in its notification to the driver, emphasizing the driver's responsibility to 
serve the subpoenas duces tecum and notifies the driver of the opportunity to demonstrate the 
circumstances for continuing the Administrative License Suspension Hearing with a showing of 
good cause. 
JO 
The party challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency violated a constitutional 
provision and that a substantial right of the party has been prejudiced. 
In re Beyer, 155 /daho 40,304 P.3d 1206 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013). 
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Mr. Hawkins failure to take advantage of the Department's process and then inviting the 
Department's Hearing Officer's consideration of a solution is invited error for which Mr. Hawkins 
cannot claim a due process violation. 
No additional or substitute procedure reduces the risk of an errenous deprivation of Mr. 
Hawkins' driving privileges. 
The administrative license suspension should be reinstated and Mr. Hawkins driving 
privileges suspended for one year. 
DATED this day of July, 2016. 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
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I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that a true 




Mailed by regular first class mail, 
And deposited in the United States 
Post Office 
Sent by facsimile and mailed by 
Regular first class mail, and 
Deposited in the United States 
Post Offiee 
Sent by Federal Express, overnight 
Delivery 
Hand delivered 
To: Jonathan D. Hally 
Blewett Mushlitz Hally, LLP 
P.O. Box 1990 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
day ofJuly, 2016. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 12 
